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ABSTRACT: The role of emotion modeling in the development of computerized agents has long been unclear. This is
partially due to instability in the philosophical issues of the problem as psychologists struggle to build models for their
own purposes, and partially due to the often-wide gap between these theories and that which can be implemented by an
agent author. This paper describes an effort to use emotion models in part as a deep model of utility for use in decision
theoretic agents. This allows for the creation of simulated forces capable of balancing a great deal of competing goals,
and in doing so they behave, for better or for worse, in a more realistic manner.

1. Introduction
Our broad research goal is concerned with demonstrating
how existing human behavior modeling frameworks can
be effectively synthesized and deployed in agent decision
processing [1]. A particularly important goal is to
illustrate how these models help systematically capturing
and portraying individual differences in socially intelligent
agents. For example, how can agents be created to
systematically reflect contextually relevant emotions and
personality, and further, how do these affect their decision
making behavior.
Within the military training domain, these research issues
manifest themselves as the desire to be able to dial up
different opponent groups against which to train, e.g. the
Iraqi Republican Guard, the Hamas-style suicide bomber,
or the clandestine minions of Bin Laden.
The idea that humans are rational actors whose decisions
are often clouded by emotion is as old as Western thought.
Until recently, artificial intelligence research concentrated
primarily on the “rational” aspect of this, reasoning that
since the problem of making good decisions is so difficult
in itself that to introduce emotion into the equation would
make the performance of the agent even worse. Recent
theories e.g. [1, 2, 5], however, suggest a quite different
relationship: that emotions are a vital part of the decisionmaking process that manage the influence of a great deal

of competing motivations. According to these theories,
integrating emotion models into our agents will yield not
only better decision-makers, but also more realistic
behavior by providing a deep model of utility. These
agents will delicately balance, for example, threat
elimination versus self-preservation, in much the same
way it is believed that people do.
To begin to model this computationally, it is first
necessary to model how emotions come about. A variety
of tools are available from the psychology literature,
particularly a class of models known as cognitive
appraisal theories. These include the models of Lazarus
[5], Roseman [9], and Ortony, Clore, and Collins (OCC)
[7], and take as input a set of things that the agent is
concerned about and how they were effected recently, and
determine which emotions result. For example, the OCC
model separates concerns into goals (desired states of the
world), standards (ideas about how people should act) and
preferences (likes and dislikes). These are evaluated
against the current state of the world, and some mixture of
twenty-two emotions results. A key idea of these theories
is that emotions are intrinsically valenced – they can be
identified as being desirable or undesirable. This implies
a relationship with the utility functions that drive decision
theory.

Confirmation

Anticipated?

(Dis)Confirmed
(Dis)Confirmed
Unconfirmed
(Dis)Confirmed

No
Yes
Yes
No

Effected
Agent
Self
Self
Self
Other

Intensity Variables

Importance
Importance, previous probability, effort expended, degree realized
Importance, probability
Importance to other, importance to self, extent deserved, extent
(dis)liked
conditions evaluate to true, and fails when the negations of
Table 3.1: Intensity factors for goals
its preconditions are confirmed to be true. The importance
This output can be made useful to such decision theory of an active goal can be modeled as inversely proportional
algorithms by creating a utility function that combines to the number of acceptable alternative means of
these emotions and their intensities into a single number accomplishing the same step in the plan.
representing the desirability of a course of action. The
details of this are personality-dependent, as, for example, 2.1.2 Interest goals
some individuals are extremely shame averse, and will Interest goals differ slightly in that in general agents
avoid courses of action that lead to significant goal cannot take direct action to accomplish them. These
successes if they believe them to be morally reprehensible. become particularly important in game theoretic decision
Given such a utility function, various decision-making making, as an important interest goal of one agent may be
strategies then become applicable: score maximization, entirely thwartable by the actions of an opponent.
game theory, least regret, etc.
It is not clear exactly how interest goals come to be held
This paper describes a partially implemented system by an agent, and for this reason they are implemented as
representing these ideas, using the OCC model to generate
static parts of an agent’s goal hierarchy with importance
emotions. The scenario involves the planning of a values set by the agent author.
While this does
terrorist bombing mission. The emotional outcomes of oversimplify their role, there is likely a complex social
terrorist missions are particularly important to consider, as and psychological process involved in the creation and
rarely are such attacks designed with force on force maintenance of interest goals, and doing justice to this is
attrition in mind – it is precisely the emotional impact on beyond the scope of this current article.
the enemy and the general populace that makes the
In order to determine the intensities of emotions pertaining
mission worth doing.
to the success or failure of goals, the OCC model uses
several variables depending upon the context of the
2. The OCC Model
situation. Specifically, the variables used depend on
As mentioned previously, the OCC model divides the whether the event is confirmed, disconfirmed, or
concerns of an agent into goals, standards, and unconfirmed, whether the event was anticipated, and
whether it happened to the agent itself or someone else.
preferences.
Table 3.1 shows the intensity variables associated with
each permutation of these variables.
2.1 Goals
Goals can take one of three forms: 1) active goals, which
the agent can directly plan to make happen (I want to
reload my rifle); 2) interest goals, which are states of the
world that the agent would like to become reality but
generally has no say in (I want important missions); and 3)
replenishment goals, which periodically spawn active
goals based on time since last fulfillment (I do not want to
starve).

Unfortunately, it is far from clear how some of these can
be computed. For this reason, the system as implemented
to date tracks only the importance, probability, and
temporal proximity of goals. The variables pertaining to
how one agent feels about another are considered
relationship parameters, and will be discussed later.
Degree deserved, effort expended, and degree of
realization are left for future research.

2.1.1 Active goals
Active goals are those states of the world that an agent is
currently engaged in and attempts to bring about through
direct manipulation of the environment. These typically
manifest as the individual steps of a plan, and can be
tightly integrated with a planner as demonstrated by
Gratch [4]. An active goal succeeds when its post-

2.1.3 Replenishment goals
Replenishment goals are essentially recurring active goals
whose success or failure is a function of how long it has
been since they were last fulfilled. As implemented, for
some time after fulfillment they are considered to have
succeeded. After this time they are considered unaffected

until, when a goal-specific amount of time has elapsed,
they are considered to be failing.

another agent’s concern structures, this intensity factor is
not is not yet implemented.

2.1.4 Goal-based emotions
Under the OCC model, unanticipated confirmed goal
successes and failures for one’s self generate joy and
distress, where anticipated goal effects in an unconfirmed
state generate hope and fear. In a confirmed state, hope
and fear will turn to satisfaction or disappointment,
respectively, and in the disconfirmed state fear and hope
become relief and, for lack of a better term, fearsconfirmed. When evaluating how the goals of others have
been effected, goal successes will generate happy-for or
resentment, and goal failures will generate gloating or
pity, depending on whether the agent in question is liked
or disliked by the agent experiencing the emotion.

2.3 Preferences

2.2 Standards
Standards are not unlike interest goals in that they are
passive in nature. However, since they represent how
people should behave, they are triggered not only when
something relevant happens to the agent, but when
something relevant happens to anyone. We are affected
by reading accounts of ancient warfare practices not
because these still can threaten us (or anyone we care
about) in any tangible way, but because they often differ
so greatly from what we consider acceptable.
2.2.1 Standards-based emotions
Standards are responsible for what the OCC model terms
“attribution emotions”. When responsibility for an action
is attributed to one’s self, pride or shame will result.
When attributed to an external agent, these turn to
admiration or reproach.
The intensities of standards-based emotions are effected
by three primary factors.
The degree of judged
praiseworthiness or blameworthiness is the first, and is
implemented as the result of the significance function for
an effected standard.
The strength of the cognitive unit between the emoting
agent and the agent performing the action determines the
degree to which one will feel, for instance, shame as
opposed to reproach for the blameworthy actions of
another person. It is often the case that one will indeed
feel a self-focused emotion about, for instance, the actions
of one’s country, even though that individual strictly had
nothing to do with that particular action.
The third intensity factor involves deviations from rolebased expectations. This captures the idea that we
generally do not develop intense feelings about things we
expect of people. As there is not yet a system in place for
managing roles and the development of beliefs about

Lastly, preferences track the likes and dislikes of an agent.
While typically pertaining to objects (I dislike broccoli), it
is important particularly in military scenarios to note that
it is entirely possible to view another agent as an object.
This has the side effect of making them not subject to
standards, and consequently an agent will not feel
standards-based emotions about anything done to the
objectified agent. This includes, for example, the shame
normally felt for inflicting needless harm on another
person.
2.3.1 Preference-based emotions
Emotions resulting from effects upon preferences come
only in two varieties under the OCC model: liking and
disliking.
Preference-based emotions have only two intensity
factors. The degree to which an object is considered
appealing or unappealing is modeled again using the
significance function. As advertisers are well aware,
familiarity with an object breeds a tendency to express a
preference for it, and as the second intensity factor, this
amplifies the intensity of liking and dampens the intensity
of disliking.
2.4 Representation of Goals, Standards, and
Preferences
In this implementation, goals, standards, and preferences,
collectively referred to here as concerns, are arranged
hierarchically, with parent nodes being that which
motivates their children. A goal to write a paper may have
as children finding a topic, doing research, opening a word
processor, and typing. Each concern contains a fulfillment
condition and a thwarting condition, indicating when it
has been satisfied and when it has become impossible, and
two importance values indicating the degree to which its
success or failure directly causes the success or failure of
its parent. Importance values range from 0 to 1, with 1
indicating that if the child succeeds/fails the parent
succeeds/fails totally, and 0 indicating that the
success/failure of the child is irrelevant to the parent. In
this example, finding a topic is critical to writing the
paper, giving it a failure importance of 1.0, but finding a
topic is only a small part of finishing the entire paper,
giving it a substantially smaller success importance.
Figure 2.1 shows this graphically. The number before the
slash is the success importance, and the number after the
slash is the failure importance.

preference-based emotions, respectively: 1) the degree to
which X views Y as an agent; 2) the degree to which X
views Y as an object.
2.6 Calculating Intensities
At each event, all agents evaluate their goals, standards,
and preferences, as well as those of the other agents they
know. A success or failure is given a significance value
by multiplying importance values up the hierarchy. The
significance of a concern c is determined by the equation:
Figure 2.1: Hierarchical goal structure
Equation 2.1
Fulfillment and thwarting conditions are expressed using
predicate logic with functions and relations defined in
arbitrary Python code that draws upon the agent's
knowledge of the world. Each logical statement is
quantified over two variables indicating who is the agent
performing the action and who is the direct object of this
action. If a particular goal has been effected, a list of time
intervals when the statement is believed to be true is
returned along with confidence values (interpreted as
probabilities) and variable bindings. Consequently, four
pieces of information are conveyed to the agent: 1)
whether this concern has been effected in the past or may
be effected in the future, 2) how confident the agent is that
this is the case, 3) who is responsible for this occurring,
and 4) who was affected by this event. The structure of
this information closely resembles that which is conveyed
in the construal frames of Elliot [2].
As currently implemented, the functions used by these
predicates are simple table lookups with values set by the
scenario designer. When attached to a more complete
agent model, however, they will draw upon the current
beliefs of the agent. A number of important issues are
hidden here, particularly credit/blame assignment and
determining the probability and temporal proximity of
future events.
2.5 Relationships
One of the most important functions of emotions is to
regulate our behavior in social situations. As such, agents
must represent not only their own concerns, but also those
of the other agents they know. The OCC model uses four
parameters involving how agents feel about one another,
again dependent upon the type of emotion being
generated. For each pair of agents (X, Y), the following
are defined by the model: 1) the degree to which X likes
Y; 2) the degree to which X dislikes Y; 3) the degree to
which X has formed a cognitive unit with Y; and 4) the
degree to which X is familiar with Y. Two additional
parameters were added for implementation purposes, to be
used in determining the intensities of standards-based and

⎧1 if c is the root
so ( c ) = ⎨
⎩Io(c, p(c)) *so(p(c)) otherwise
where o is the outcome for a concern c (either success or
failure), so(c) is the significance of c for outcome o, Io (c1,
c2) is the importance under o of c1 to c2, and p(c) is the
parent of c.
This significance value is then used in an emotion-specific
equation along with other intensity factors discussed
previously to determine the intensity of a specific
emotion. These equations are given in Appendix A.

3. Linking Emotion to Utility
Appraisal models are consistent in their reliance upon a set
of agent concerns, but for the most part give no advice
about how to determine what these concerns might be for
a fully developed agent. At the highest level, the works of
Maslow [5] are relevant, pointing out five basic motives
from which all others are derived: 1) physiological needs;
2) safety needs; 3) social belonging; 4) personal esteem;
and 5) self-actualization needs. Though we reject his
seriality premise, Maslow’s work has been empirically
shown to be descriptive of individuals across cultures, age
groups, and generations, and is consequently a rich source
of high-level goals, standards, and preferences.
In terms of creating reusable models of emotive agents,
what is needed is a rich hierarchy of goals, standards and
preferences for each type of agent. A good example of
such a rich hierarchy for terrorists may be found in
Weaver & Silverman [10]. That work shows a hierarchy
of cases that differs across terrorists who come from
different organizations. Further it shows how to devise
hierarchies for new groups as a function of their political
setting, ideology, campaign & mission aims, operational
objectives, and so on.
At still lower levels, concerns vary widely among
individuals. To develop a complete model of what an

agent cares about, we must probe deeper into who we are
modeling. Upbringing, personal history, and individual
quirks can all significantly effect what goals, standards,
and preferences an agent is likely to hold. Two terrorists
even from the same group will tend to have differences in
their care, as will any two soldiers. However, we may not
care to model such fine-gained differences. Also, several
effects in clandestine terrorist cells tend to drive them to
be consensual (e.g., being isolated from others and
needing to belong to the cell, as well as the well known
“risky shift” effect).
Finally, it should be noted that when describing a group of
people after extensive study, the language used by authors
often directly translates into a description of their common
goals, standards, and preferences, and how they differ
from other groups. From this we hope to derive a reusable
database of archetypes, from which we can provide agent
authors a template to use in instantiating members of an
organization.
Even given such a system, we must account for the effects
of one more dimension of individual differences. Despite
similar emotional outcomes, different people will often
still choose different alternatives: some are pleasure
seekers, some are tremendously averse to distress, and still
others will endure great pain as their goals fail in order to
uphold their standards. We have chosen to represent this
observation by taking into account the “Big 5” personality
traits [7].
According to this taxonomy, the personality of an
individual can be parameterized into five dimensions:
surgency, agreeableness, conscientiousness, emotional
stability, and openness to new experiences. Each of these
dimensions is implemented as scored from 0 to 1, and acts
as a weight upon certain emotions when combining into
utility.
The term surgency refers to the degree to which agents are
proactive in achieving their goals. Individuals strongly
exhibiting this trait consider advancement of their own
goals to be of paramount importance, potentially at the
expense of failing standards and preferences, or negative
emotional outcomes for others. A surgent individual will
not think twice given an opportunity to wade through raw
sewage for a chance to surprise an unprepared enemy. As
implemented, this trait weights the importance of and joy,
satisfaction, relief, and liking.
The second factor in the taxonomy is agreeableness.
Agreeable individuals are strongly concerned about the
goals of others, and will often suppress their own to see
them satisfied. An agent dominated by this trait will often
betray his instincts to follow orders. This trait weights the

contribution to utility of gloating, pity, happy-for, and
resentment.
Conscientiousness is the third trait of the Big 5, and
measures the degree to which agents consider the full
ramifications of their actions before taking them. Those
strongly exhibiting this trait avoid courses of actions
leading to negative consequences, even if accompanied by
substantial positive ones. Such agents are unlikely to
choose courses of action considered dishonorable, or
risky, often at the expense of opportunities to achieve goal
successes. This trait is used as a weight for distress, fearsconfirmed, disappointment, disliking, pride, shame,
admiration, and reproach.
The fourth factor is Emotional Stability, which, for
decision-making purposes, governs the degree to which an
agent is willing to endure pain along the path to goal
achievement. An emotionally stable person, despite moral
and other objections to a course of action, may still choose
it if under the impression that it will have a significantly
positive effect on things later on. This term weights the
importance of immediate gratification by recursively
adding the utilities of an imagined successor states.
Openness to Experience captures the observation that
occasionally agents will choose an emotionally-neutral,
not previously explored course of action over one proven
to provide some degree of gratification.
This is
accomplished by having this parameter act as a negative
weight upon the most intense emotion generated by a
course of action.
Given a full model of the concerns of an agent, an emotion
model that combines these with events to create feelings,
and these five personality factors, we must still combine
these into a single number in order to utilize the wealth of
pre-existing decision theory algorithms in existence. We
use the following equation to convert emotion intensities
to utility using personality:
Equation 3.1

U (c) = Ps* ( Ejoy + Esatisfaction + Erelief + Eliking ) +
Pa * ( Ehappyfor + Eresentment − Egloating− Epity ) −
Pc * (Edistress + Efearsconfirmed + Edisappointment + Edisliking ) +
Pc * [( Epride − Eshame) + ( Eadmiration − Ereproach)] −
Pe * max( E ) +
Pm * U (successor (c))
where U(c) is the utility of course of action c; Ps, Pa, Pc,
Pe, and Pm are the personality dimensions surgency,
agreeableness, conscientiousness, openness to experience,
and emotional stability, respectively; and Ex is the

maximum intensity of emotion x (Ix) over all possible
concern effects times the perceived probability of this
outcome actually occurring.

military outpost. The relevant goals and standards of
Terrorist A are shown in Figures 3.1 and 3.2, respectively.

As currently implemented and in the following example,
the system only determines courses of action one step
ahead, and consequently the emotional stability term has
no effect.
3.3 Example Scenario
To illustrate the processes described above, consider the
problem of mission planning and executing from the point
of three different terrorists, all of whom share a common
enemy. Terrorists A and B also share a common set of
goals, motivated by a religious conflict of interests with
their enemy. However, Terrorist B believes passionately
that sacred landmarks, even those of conflicting religions,
should not be desecrated, where Terrorist A holds no such
standard. Terrorist C, while sharing many basic goals
with A and B, has been driven to commit an act of
terrorism based on a difference in political ideologies
rather than religion. Specifically, Terrorist C is a
communist striking against a capitalist regime.
Weaver, Silverman, et al.[10], present a framework for
semi-automatically generating the utility structure of the
terrorist groups, such as A, B, and C. This utility structure
emphasizes the importance of missions to the campaign,
targets to missions, and operational details, and how all
this effects the population. It is particularly important for
terrorists to carefully consider how their actions will effect
their relationship with the surrounding population.
Additionally, an action means nothing if the enemy is
unaffected. Therefore, each terrorist is concerned about
the potential outcomes for himself, his enemy, and an
aggregate agent representing the general populace.
Specifically, each terrorist holds a goal that succeeds when
(and to the extent that) the populace is positively affected,
and fails when the populace is negatively affected. Since
this conflict is essentially a zero-sum game between the
terrorist and his enemy, game theory is used to model the
decision-making process. That is, the Weaver, Silverman,
et al. framework is meant to be used offline to generalize
structural differences between groups (and individual
agents). Here we explain a dynamic framework for using
their need structures to process emotions and personality
differences.
To simplify the example, we will assume for now that all
three terrorists share the same scores for each personality
trait. Let Ps=Pa=Pc=Pe=Pm=0.5.
Consider the target selection process. The three terrorists
are aware of five potential targets: a bank, a sports arena,
a religious landmark, a government building, and a

Figure 3.1: Goals for Terrorist A

Figure 3.2: Standards for Terrorist A
To select a target, Terrorist A will first examine the utility
to himself of attacking each, beginning with the bank. On
the positive side, as a high-profile, highly secured target, a
successful mission against it will gain significant publicity
for the organization in addition to having an impact on the
financial infrastructure of the current regime.
Furthermore, Terrorist A has no moral objection to this
course of action, and will indeed feel some pride upon
successfully striking this target since he has taken action
to end an undesirable situation. However, due to its high
security, his goal to avoid getting caught, and in turn the
security of the entire organization is threatened.
To determine whether popular opinion will be positively
or negatively effected, it is necessary to evaluate the
emotional outcome of this situation for what the terrorist
believes to be the concerns of the general populace. The
goals and standards of these are shown in Figures 3.3 and
3.4, respectively. In this case, a mixture of joy, reproach,
admiration, and distress results, causing the goal to sway
popular opinion to be threatened. Consequently, as a target
the bank has the potential to create high levels of joy
(attrition and publicity), distress (getting caught and losing
crowd support), and lower levels of pride. Given equal
weightings from personality factors, these are combined
via equation 8.1 to produce a utility of x. A partial
calculation, showing the contribution made to utility by

the potential event-based emotions generated by attacking
a secure target, is shown in Table 3.1.
Emotion
Distress
Joy

Intensity Prob.
0.6
0.9
0.1
0.1
Table 3.1

Partial U
-0.54
0.01

Thus the high probability of the failure of this goal will
cause a substantial (-0.53) lowering of the utility of this
alternative in all but the least conscientious of agents.

time from the point of view of the regime in power, whose
leader’s goals and standards are shown in partially in
Figures 3.5 and 3.6.

Target

Utility to
Terrorist

Bank

-0.27

Arena

-0.56

Government building

-0.12

Religious landmark

0.32

Military Outpost

-0.12

Primary
Contributio
ns
Security
threat
(-),
populace
reaction (-)
Populace
reaction (-),
publicity (+)
Security
threat (-)
Attrition (+),
populace
reaction (-)
Security
threat (-)

Table 3.2

Figure 3.3: Terrorist’s View of Populace’s Goals

Figure 3.4: Terrorist’s View of Populace’s Standards
A similar process is undergone to determine the utility of
the other targets, as shown in Table 3.2. Note that given
the importance of religion to this terrorist, attacking a
religious landmark is considered most attractive in terms
of goal achievement. Furthermore, unlike Terrorist B,
Terrorist A has no standard indicating that this is
unacceptable behavior.
Since we have chosen to represent the decision-making
process using game theory, we must also now determine
the utility of each of the possible terrorist courses of action
for the enemy. A gratifying, successful attack on a target
is not nearly as attractive if it creates an opportunity for
the enemy to eliminate his organization entirely or turn the
populace further against him. Additionally, in the absence
of an opportunity to directly achieve his goals, he may be
able to put the enemy in a situation in which they do it for
him. Consider again the utility of a bank bombing, this

Figure 3.5: Enemy leader’s goals

Figure 3.6: Enemy leader’s standards
In short, the enemy would love to see a terrorist target its
bank. Given the security measures in place, a number of
goal successes are highly probable: threat elimination,
demonstrating the security of the populace’s interests (and

in turn securing valuable support from them), etc. The
successful defense of this territory will also generate pride,
and consequently, the utility of this course of action to the
enemy will be extremely high, making it less attractive to
the terrorist than originally estimated. A similar process is
undergone for each other target, with results shown in
Table 3.3. Note again that due to the importance of the
religious institution to the populace and its lack of
security, the utility of having this building targeted is
extremely low to the enemy. Given that it is already
highly attractive to this terrorist, it should come as no
surprise which target will be selected by Terrorist A.
Target

Bank

Utility
to
Enemy
0.65

Arena

-0.29

Government building

0.51

Religious landmark

-0.48

Military Outpost

1.1

Primary
Contributions
Terrorist attrition
(+),
populace
reaction
(+),
positive press (+)
Shame
(-),
populace
reaction (-)
Terrorist attrition
(+), pride (+),
positive press (+)
Populace
reaction
(-),
shame (-)
Terrorist attrition
(+), pride (+)

Table 3.3
We now turn to the decision-making process of Terrorist
B. Since they have the same goals and nearly the same
standards, the utility of all targets excepting one is
unchanged. However, due to his strict objection to
destroying religious ground, even that of a religion to
which he is violently opposed, a significant amount of
shame would be induced by selecting this alternative,
lowering its utility enough that Terrorist B will choose
Terrorist A’s second choice, the sports arena.

Figure 3.7: Terrorist B’s standards
Terrorist C is motivated by substantially different
concerns from A or B. Since his primary motivation is
political/economic in nature, targets involving commerce
begin with higher importance values attached to their
success in the goal structure. Consequently, they generate

a higher potential for joy. However, as this terrorist has
the same resources as the other two, the successful
bombing of high security areas is still quite unlikely, and it
is still highly undesirable to get caught. Terrorist C then
faces will choose the sports arena as well, citing its
symbolic value as a center of commerce in addition to its
vulnerability.

4. Conclusions and Next Steps
This paper has explained a framework for integrating
cognitive appraisal (emotion models) and personality
theory into agent decision-making. This framework is
based on the OCC model, but that model alone only
generates emotional state. It is unable to provide agent
decision guidance. This paper’s contribution is to provide
one way to extend cognitive appraisal in general, and the
OCC model, in particular, into a mechanism for choosing
between alternative decisions and courses of action. We
do that mathematically by trying each of the 22 OCC
emotions in a principled way to one of the “Big 5”
personality factors and by using that in a utility calculation
equation. Thus, any event, agent action, or object
precipitates a utility based on emotional intensity and on
personality weights. These utilities in turn are what
determine decision options in the classical game-theoretic
approach.
Reducing emotion and personality to utility calculation
may be elegant, and it may even be a computational
advance for the agent field, however, that does not
alleviate us from a number of validity concerns. We have
raised some of these concerns earlier such as the validity
of the OCC model (and its choice of 22 emotions),
ignoring nuances and subtleties of emotions and personal
reaction at the fine-grained level, and the lack of empirical
support for only 5 factors in the Big 5 model. We have
also mentioned our assertion that validity concerns are
partially mitigated by the higher granularity that most
models address. However, one could more explicitly
address such concerns via a Monte Carlo simulation
covering variations one might expect to arise at the finegrained levels. We have not attempted such an approach.
The system described here was designed to be integrated
into a larger agent model. As such, a number of important
features are handled crudely, as they are simply
placeholders for the deeper functionality offered by a
more complete model.
Probability assessment and
credit/blame assignment are primary among these. Also,
we are currently involved in an effort to integrate this
system as part of a larger agent model into JSAF.

To represent the dynamic nature of active goals and their
relationship with interest and replenishment goals, it
would be beneficial to tightly integrate the decisionmaking process with a planner, and feed the results back
into the goal structure. This will allow not only make the
model more complete, but may also begin to implement
the problem-focused coping mechanisms described by
Lazarus [5]. By not explicitly modeling emotion decay as
a function of time, our agents will be forced to make
decisions taking into account not only the emotional
outcome of their actions, but also whether or not they help
to solve some pre-existing problem. If a terrorist runs out
of gasoline on the drive to his target, he has no choice but
to first eliminate the associated distress – the potential joy
of mission accomplishment cannot be attained with no
way of getting to the target, so every course of action
aside from finding a gas station will result in nothing but
persistent distress and likely shame.
In the event that an emotion cannot be eliminated by
planning a way to make it stop failing, it will be necessary
to model what Lazarus terms emotion-focused coping,
which can be modeled by shifting importance values in the
concern structures so that the effected concern becomes
insignificant enough to stop causing an emotion. While
far from straightforward to implement, this approach
should yield a powerful method of creating agents whose
concerns change with experience. We will thus have
agents who become demoralized, complacent, obsessed, or
bored, among other things.
Agents currently have complete knowledge of one
another’s concern structures. This is far from realistic,
and could have dramatic effects if a model of how people
acquire such information from one another is
implemented. This is primarily a recognition problem,
involving taking raw data about some history of actions
taken by an agent, their outcome, and what emotional
reactions were observed, and attempting to assemble this
into a model of what motivated these actions.
As currently represented, relationships are also static and
determined in a rather ad hoc fashion. It may be possible
to derive these parameters directly from evaluating the
concerns of one agent against what she believes to be the
concerns of another. Goal compatibility likely correlates
with liking an individual. Having many goals effected in
the same way by the exact same events likely contributes
to a substantial cognitive unit between two parties.
Familiarity may simply be the extent to which one
believes his model of another to be complete. By deriving
these parameters in this way from the beliefs of agents
about others, we obtain a dynamically evolving
relationship.

This framework lends itself naturally towards an
exploration of implementing the thoughts of Damasio,
whereby decision-making will be done in not only a more
naturalistic way, but also using potentially far less
computation time.

Appendix A: Intensity Equations

Ihappyfor = S ( sg ) * Rl
Igloating = S ( sg ) * Rd
Iresentment =S ( fg ) * Rd
Ipity = S ( fg ) * Rl
Ihope = S ( sg ) * P( sg ) * N
Ifear = S ( fg ) * P( sg ) * N
Isatisfaction = Previous Ihope * (1 − N )
Ifearsconfirmed = Previous Ifear *(1 − N )
Irelief = Previous Ifear * (1 − N )
Idisappointment = Previous Ihope * (1 − N )
Ijoy = S ( fg ) * O * (1 − N )
Idistress = S ( fg ) * O * (1 − N )
Ipride = S ( ss ) * Rc
Ishame = S ( fs ) * Rc
Iadmiration = S ( ss ) * [(1 − Rc ) + Ra ] / 2
Ireproach = S ( fs ) * [(1 − Rc ) + Ra ] / 2
⎧0 if abs( Ipride - Ijoy) > .2
Igratification = ⎨
⎩max( Ipride, Ijoy ) otherwise
⎧0 if abs( Ishame - Idistress) > .2
Iremorse = ⎨
⎩max( Ishame, Idistress) otherwise
⎧0 if abs( Ireproach - Idistress) > .2
Ianger = ⎨
⎩max( Ireproach, Idistress) otherwise
⎧0 if abs( Iadmiration - Ijoy) > .2
Igratitude = ⎨
⎩max( Iadmiration, Ijoy ) otherwise
Iliking = S ( sp ) * Ro * Rf
Idisliking = S ( fp ) * Ro * (1 − Rf )

⎧1 if the time interval in question begins after now
N =⎨
⎩0 otherwise

⎧1 if we have previously had a
⎪
O = ⎨ prospect - based emotion about this goal
⎪0 otherwise
⎩
where sg is a succeeded goal; fg is a failed goal; ss is a
succeeded standard; fs is a failed standard; sp is a
succeeded preference; fp is a failed preference; Rl, Rd, Rc,
Rf, Ra, and Ro are the liking, disliking, cognitive unit,
familiarity, agent, and object relationship parameters,
respectively; P is a function determining the probability of
the success or failure in question occurring; and S is the
significance function given previously.
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